How Much Will You Pay for Better Schools?

By David Postic

 

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Oklahoma does not value education. Our spending shows it. Our outcomes show it. The number of teachers flocking to other states for better pay and better schools (or, in Oklahoma, leaving the profession entirely) show it. Each year, it seems like the Legislature keeps cutting and cutting and cutting the education budget as our classroom size keeps growing and growing and growing. Each year, we complain that the Legislature needs to get their act together, that it needs to better fund our schools. And each year, we are absolutely right. But it’s also easy to complain; it’s tougher to conceptualize. What would better education look like in Oklahoma? What would it cost?

The Problem

First things first: let’s go ahead and admit that we are not funding our schools like we should. Because we aren’t. Over the past 10 years, Common Education funding in Oklahoma has increased a mere $78,680,179, not adjusted for inflation ($2,348,041,255 in FY 2007 compared with $2,426,721,434 in FY 2017). That might sound like a lot of money, but just wait. Adjusting for inflation (because we can), annual spending on Common Ed has actually decreased to the tune of $389,722,187 (or ~14%). To put that in comparison, the amount of money the Legislature has cut from Common Ed (let’s not even get into the amount it’s cut from Higher Ed) could pay the entire Thunder payroll (pre-salary cap increase) for 5 years. It could pay the Red Sox payroll for 2 years. Or it could buy 121,550 of these super nice toilets to symbolize where the Legislature is throwing our education funding. It’s that much money.

But to be fair, a decrease in funding, by itself, is not necessarily bad. If we have fewer students, then per-pupil funding stays the same, right? Theoretically, yes, dear reader, you would be right. Only that’s not the case. Because we don’t have fewer students. We have more students. We have many more students. To be precise, as of April 2016, Oklahoma is home to 692,670 students, which is a 50,999 student (or ~8%) increase from 2007. (We don’t have enrollment totals for FY 2017, so the comparison of enrollment to funding is a bit off, but it’s close enough.) Funding has gone down; enrollment has gone up. Uh oh.

What this means is that our per-pupil, inflation-adjusted state funding for Common Ed has decreased by $1,761 over the last 10 years ($5,264 in 2007 to $3,503 in 2017), or about 33%. Keep in mind that state funding is only about 45% of total funding for public education; another 45% is local funding from property taxes, bonds, etc.; and 10% comes from the federal government (these numbers are slightly different in Oklahoma, but you get the idea). So at first blush, a decrease in spending may seem like it has a silver lining, what with all the tax money we don’t have to pay and whatnot (more on this later). But because a decrease in state funding means that local funding has to pick up the slack, you will end up paying about the same amount in taxes—and some people will even have to pay more—if we are to maintain constant levels of funding.

Of course, that’s the problem: we aren’t maintaining constant levels of funding to Common Ed. We are siphoning it off to pay for tax breaks to corporations and the wealthy. That’s a judgment call our state Legislature has made. And it’s wrong. Their judgment is wrong. They have decided that it is more politically expedient to sacrifice the potential of us students than to make the difficult call to halt tax breaks or—God forbid—raise taxes. They have decided that our students don’t deserve better. That our teachers don’t deserve better. That our state doesn’t deserve better. And they are absolutely 100% wrong.

The Solution

But I digress. I’m not just here to complain (although I’m definitely here to do that); I’m here to offer some solutions. Mostly, though, I want to quantify (in very brief and simple terms) what it will take to better our public schools. As a result, my focus is on revenue and does not cover qualitative improvements to Oklahoma education.

Let’s start with the obvious: Oklahoma hates taxes. Like, a lot. Like OU hates Texas. Like Donald Trump hates facts. Like everyone hates Ramsay Bolton. That much. As a result, we cut taxes a lot. How much do these tax breaks cost, you ask? Great question.

Exceedingly low tax rates for horizontal drilling will cost us in the neighborhood of $379 million in 2016 (and that’s just horizontal drilling tax breaks, not to mention other tax breaks for the oil and gas industry), while wind power credits are expected to cost another $133 million. I point out these two tax breaks for special treatment because—as every Oklahoma knows—oil and wind are two things that this state does not have in short supply. So it begs the question why we need such high tax breaks at all? Of course, a little incentive is fine. But our tax rate on horizontal drilling, for instance, is well below other states, and it’s not like oil companies are going to stop coming to Oklahoma—we have all the oils. As State Secretary of Finance Preston Doerflinger has said, a fiscally responsible policymaker “needs to seriously consider at what level government should incentivize something that is now standard practice.” Even walking back these two tax breaks a tiny bit could bring in tens of millions of dollars in new revenue. Phasing them out entirely (which, for horizontal drilling, would merely return to the ordinary 7% gross-production rate) would be half a billion dollars in the bank.

But these corporate tax breaks (and many more) pale in comparison to the lost revenue from cuts to the state income tax rate. Since the top rate (which applies to income above $7,200; the first $7,200 is taxed at rates between 1/2% to 4%) has been cut from 6.65% in 2004 to 5% in 2016, Oklahoma’s annual revenue loss is $1.022 billion. Annual. Billion. Is. What was that really big thing we had this year? A budget deficit? And how much was it? $1.3 billion? An extra billion dollars really would have helped with that. Too bad.

Now, tax cuts are nice. I like money. Money is good. Money buys me things like Netflix subscriptions and raisins and trips to Harry Potter World. But how much money did these tax cuts actually give us? And are they really even worth the cost? As of 2016, about 72% of the benefit from these cuts (about $735 million in 2016) goes to the wealthiest 20% of households (those making $246,000 a year). The wealthiest 5% of households ($568,000 a year) get 43% of the benefits. And the wealthiest 1% receive about the same benefit as the bottom 80%. The Oklahoma Policy Institute put this disparity in dollar terms:

The median Oklahoma household with annual income of $49,800 has seen its taxes reduced by $228, compared to a $15,519 cut for the average household in the top 1 percent (income of $476,600 and above). Households making less than $21,700 — the bottom 20 percent of households — have received an average of just $4 per year from cutting the top rate, since little or none of their income is taxed at the top tax brackets.

But wait, the inequity gets even bigger. When looking at the share of income paid in taxes, the Institute on Tax and Economic Policy has calculated that, in 2015, the poorest 20% of Oklahomans paid 10.5% of their income in state and local taxes compared to just 4.3% paid by the wealthiest 1%, or about 2.4 times as much. The middle 60% paid, on average, 9.3% of their income in taxes, 2.2 times as much as the top 1 percent. In policy terms, this is called a regressive tax system, as it places a larger burden on low-income households than on high-income households.

A billion dollars of lost revenue. Very little money in my pocket. And I pay more of my income than do wealthy people (who, coincidentally, benefit much more than I do from these tax breaks). Remind me why these tax cuts are good again? Oh yeah, because they foster growth and improve the economy. Only there is no evidence to support this. The nonpartisan Center on Budget and Policy Priorities looked at 40 years of data and studies on state taxes and economic performance:

The large majority of these studies find that interstate differences in tax levels, including differences in personal income taxes, have little if any effect on relative rates of state economic growth. Of the 15 major studies published in academic journals since 2000 that examined the broad economic effect of state personal income tax levels, 11 found no significant effects and one of the others produced internally inconsistent results.

In fact, four of the five states that have enacted the largest personal income tax cuts in the last five years — Maine, Kansas, Ohio and Wisconsin — have experienced total job growth and personal income growth below the national average since the tax cuts took effect. A recent study by the Urban Institute and Brookings Institution found “neither tax revenues nor top marginal income tax rates bear any stable relation to economic growth rates across states and over time.” Yet Oklahoma continues to cut its tax rates despite the fact that we cannot afford to do so. And education has suffered because of it.

So how are we to proceed? What could we do with the money even if we had it? This is where qualitative analysis comes in, and to a certain extent a mere increase in funding won’t necessarily improve outcomes. And outcomes are, to a large degree, what are most important. But money helps. And it’s easy to imagine what would be possible with an extra billion or two in funds available for education.

With an extra billion dollars, we could give our 46,571 (FTE) teachers a $21,000 raise (or at least give them the $3,338 raise they need to meet the regional average). We could roll back the 30% cut to school lunch matching programs. We could replace the $38 million cut from support for public school activities. Or we could actually buy textbooks for students. We could do so much to address the problems we have and to make Oklahoma a better place for both students and teachers. With an extra billion dollars, we could spend $1,443 more per student than we currently do, which would move us from 47th in the nation for per-pupil spending all the way up to 33rd. Those are good things. Those are things we could do. If only we had the money…

Conclusion

And we do have the money, at least in theory. There was a time when we weren’t losing a billion dollars a year in income tax cuts; there was a time we weren’t giving half a billion dollars away to energy companies. And guess what? We survived. Not cutting taxes did not kill us. Don’t get me wrong: I don’t like paying taxes. And if the Legislature eliminated all of the tax cuts mentioned above, my taxes would go up. Yours would to. But the Legislature can craft policies that minimize the impact on Oklahoma citizens while still providing the revenue we as a state need to function properly. It’s possible.

The politics of crafting those solutions is what seems impossible. Oklahoma is not a place that believes in things raising taxes or making tough political decisions. Politicians need votes to stay in office, and it will be much more difficult to get those votes if they tell their constituents that taxes are going to go up. You might feel less inclined to vote for someone who tells you that. Hell, that would give me pause. But consider this: is there anything we do as a state that is more valuable than education? Is there anything that gives our state’s future more promise? Is there anything that you would say to a child to justify taking away their free or reduced lunch, their textbooks, their teachers, their classrooms, or the educational opportunities?

It will cost us all to make education better in Oklahoma. It will cost us a lot. But our schools will be better for it; our students will be better for it; our future will be better for it. How much am I willing to pay for better schools? As much as it takes.

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See this original post on Medium.

Dissecting Fisher v. University of Texas at Austin (Part One)

By David Postic and Jacob Daniel

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Yesterday was a day of excitement for law nerds and other people of the Supreme Court-watching persuasion: we were glued to our SCOTUSblog-filled screens as the Court issued several controversial decisions having to do with everything from immigration to affirmative action to the Fourth Amendment. There has already been a fair amount of analysis and commentary on these decisions (which have subsequently been overshadowed by #Brexit), and you will likely see more of it in the days and weeks to come. For now, though, we would like to focus on one case in particular: Fisher v. University of Texas.

This article is meant to provide a brief history of affirmative action jurisprudence and a breakdown of arguments against the majority opinion; you can find the response article here.

Brief Primer on Affirmative Action

Executive Action

Before we get to yesterday’s opinion, some background on affirmative action. The concept has its official American origins in John F. Kennedy’s Executive Order 10925, which required that government employers “not discriminate against any employee or applicant for employment because of race, creed, color, or national origin” and “take affirmative action to ensure that applicants are employed, and that employees are treated during employment, without regard to their race, creed, color, or national origin.” LBJ expanded affirmative action to cover government contractors, and to guard against gender discrimination. Soon, however, affirmative action expanded to address racial disparities in other areas, including education. Universities began including race in their admissions criteria, leading to constitutional concerns that resulted in substantial litigation.

Regents of the University of California v. Bakke (1978)

The first Supreme Court case to address affirmative action in the university admissions process was Regents of the University of California v. Bakke. (Fun fact: the case was originally filed in the Superior Court of California for Yolo County. Yolo. County.) The opinion—a plurality, meaning the analysis was unable to garner a majority of the court, i.e., it does not have precedential value—held that using racial quotas in college admission decisions violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution, which affirms that “[n]o state…shall deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.” While Bakke eliminated racial quotas, it nevertheless allowed race to be considered as one of many factors in the admissions process. Such admissions systems, however, would be subject to strict scrutiny, meaning that the challenged program must be narrowly tailored to achieve a compelling state interest.

Over the next 25 years, federal appellate courts ruled on various affirmative action programs, but none of these cases reached the Supreme Court. But in 2003, the Court decided the landmark cases of Gratz v. Bollinger and Grutter v. Bollinger, both of which addressed affirmative action policies implemented by the University of Michigan.

Gratz v. Bollinger (2003)

Gratz concerned an applicant to the University of Michigan’s undergraduate program. Gratz claimed that she was denied admission based on her race (Caucasian)—namely, that the University unconstitutionally favored minorities in the admissions process. At the time, Michigan used a points-based admissions system—applicants were awarded points based on items such as race (20 points), athletic ability (20 points), depth of essay (up to 3 points), leadership and service (up to 5 points), and personal achievement (up to 5 points). Chief Justice Rehnquist, writing for the Court, struck down this system as a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. He reasoned that the points system, assigning points based on outward characteristics, treated applicants in a manner that prized their race over their individual accomplishments.

Grutter v. Bollinger (2003)

Grutter was a slightly different case, this time involving the University of Michigan law school. Similar to Gratz, Grutter argued that the law school unconstitutionally discriminated against her by using race as a factor in the admissions process. Unlike the undergraduate admissions system, however, the law school did not assign a set number of “points” for race. Rather, it was one factor among many used to judge applicants. Justice O’Connor’s majority opinion upheld the law school’s affirmative action program, holding that the Constitution “does not prohibit the law school’s narrowly tailored use of race in admissions decisions to further a compelling interest in obtaining the educational benefits that flow from a diverse student body.” The program was narrowly tailored, said O’Connor, because it was not designed to be permanent; it was merely being used to obtain a “critical mass” of minority students. O’Connor noted that she expected such programs would be unnecessary within 25 years.

Fisher v. University of Texas at Austin (2013), i.e., Fisher I

This brings us to Fisher. This is actually the second time the Court has addressed this case. In the wake of Gratz and Grutter, the Texas state legislature passed a law requiring that the University of Texas at Austin accept all students in the top 10% of each Texas high school’s graduating class, regardless of race. Applicants who, like Fisher, fail to graduate in the top 10% of their class can still gain admission by scoring highly under a “holistic review” that takes into account many factors, including race.

Fisher sued the University; both the district court and the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals upheld the admissions system. On Supreme Court review in 2013, however, the Court reversed the Fifth Circuit on a largely procedural issue: the Fifth Circuit did not apply strict scrutiny to assess UT’s admissions program, essentially placing the burden on Fisher to prove the system was not constitutional, rather than on the University to prove that it was constitutional. On remand, the Fifth Circuit applied strict scrutiny and reached the same conclusion, upholding the admissions program. Fisher then appealed again to the Supreme Court, and that is how we got to the case that was decided yesterday. Isn’t law fun?

Fisher v. University of Texas at Austin (2015), i.e., Fisher II

Justice Kennedy, writing for the majority (which was actually only four members, since there is one vacancy on the Court and Justice Kagan recused herself from deliberations), upheld the Fifth Circuit’s decision and found UT’s admissions system constitutional. Specifically, he held that the University had a compelling interest in advancing diversity in the classroom. “Considerable deference,” he wrote, “is owed to a university in defining those intangible characteristics, like student body diversity, that are central to its identity and educational mission.” Fisher submitted several arguments claiming that there were ways to more narrowly tailor the program, but the Court rejected those proposals. Kennedy did, however, order the University to “to engage in constant deliberation and continued reflection regarding its admissions policies,” and he suggested that a similar system could fail strict scrutiny under different circumstances.

Justice Alito (joined by Justice Thomas and Chief Justice Roberts) wrote a 51-page dissent, arguing that the University’s justifications were neither compelling nor narrowly tailored. In particular, he believed that the University was defining diversity only in terms of numbers, ultimately equating to “racial balancing,” which the Bakke Court held is unconstitutional. “What is at stake is whether university administrators may justify systematic racial discrimination simply by asserting that such discrimination is necessary to achieve ‘the educational benefits of diversity,’” Alito wrote, “without explaining—much less proving—why the discrimination is needed or how the discriminatory plan is well crafted to serve its objectives.”

Those are the two sides of Fisher. Below we will address arguments against the majority opinion; tomorrow, we will offer a separate article in support of the majority opinion. Hopefully you will consider both sides before making your own decision. We invite you to read these articles (and to read the actual opinion) and to add your own views in the comments below.

David: The best way to understand any Court decision is to understand the framework through which the Court analyzes the question. Here, as explained above, the test is strict scrutiny, which involves two questions: (1) Does the state actor have a compelling interest supporting its action? (2) And is the action narrowly tailored to achieve that interest? This is the most rigorous test the Supreme Court applies, and for good reason: strict scrutiny is often used to review laws that impinge upon fundamental rights and that deny citizens equal protection of the laws. So it should come as no surprise that states often have a difficult time prevailing under this framework.

Also important to understand is the burden of proof. “Burden of proof” is a legal term that means what it says: Who has the burden to prove the issue before the court? When it comes to strict scrutiny, the burden of proof is on the state actor. In other words, the state actor—not the person challenging the law—must prove both a compelling interest and narrow tailoring. This is a burden of producing arguments and evidence to support those arguments.

In the majority opinion, Justice Kennedy gave substantial deference to the University in proving its compelling interest. Although Kennedy admitted that, under strict scrutiny, the state actor must demonstrate its interest “with clarity,” throughout briefing and oral arguments the University never really offered a clear and consistent interest that it sought to advance. At times, it was achieving a “critical mass” of minority students (without explaining what a “critical mass” was), the amorphous concept of “promotion of cross-racial understanding,” or the more specific (but still vague and certainly not compelling) “robust exchange of ideas.” Remember that the burden is on the University to prove not only its interest (let’s say “racial diversity”) but also that the interest is compelling. The Supreme Court has never offered a bright-line rule for what constitutes a “compelling” state interest, so perhaps the best way to understand what “compelling interest” means is by comparison. Interests the Court has judged “compelling” include national security, health and safety, and not violating explicit constitutional protections. It seems, then, that an interest is “compelling” if it is necessary or crucial to a functioning society, as opposed to merely being preferred.

Furthermore, a “compelling” interest sits atop a hierarchy of interests that the Court has defined. So far, we have spoken about only one framework used by the Court in analyzing constitutional issues: strict scrutiny. However, there are less-intensive levels of scrutiny, so-called intermediate scrutiny and rational-basis scrutiny. (There are arguably other levels, but that would require an entirely different article.) It is not important now to know when these levels of scrutiny apply; only to know what they mean. Under intermediate scrutiny, the state actor must prove that the measure being challenged is (1) substantially related to (2) an important government interest. Under rational-basis scrutiny, the burden is only the challenger to prove that the challenged measure is not (1) legitimately related to (2) a legitimate government interest. Again, it’s not important to know how these tests apply. I simply want to illustrate that the Court actually spoke quite specifically when it required, under strict scrutiny, state actors to show a compelling government interest.

Is racial diversity in the university setting a compelling interest? I think it’s close. I would certainly agree that it is important; I just don’t know if it is compelling to the same level as national security or public health. However, the Bakke Court (affirmed in Grutter) held that it was a compelling interest. So while I believe the University did not carry its burden well, I think that it scraped by enough to satisfy the first component of strict-scrutiny analysis. My problem with the majority opinion comes from the second part of the analysis: Is the admissions program narrowly tailored to achieve the interest of diversity? Once again, the burden is on the University to prove narrow tailoring—it is not on the challenger. And I believe the University failed to carry that burden.

Narrow tailoring is a quaint legal phrase, but you may see the Court use other phrases in cases dealing with strict scrutiny. Sometimes the Court says the measure being challenged must be “necessary” to achieve a compelling state interest; sometimes it says the measure must use the “least restrictive means” to achieve that interest. Again, it helps to compare to other levels of scrutiny. Under intermediate scrutiny, the measure must be substantially related to the interest; under rational basis, the measure must be rationally related to the interest. “Narrowly tailored,” then, speaks to a very precise “fit” between the means and the end: The measure must actually achieve the compelling interest; and the means chosen to achieve that interest must not be overly broad. “Narrow tailoring” is still a vague and subjective standard, but hopefully these principles can at least give you an idea of what the Court is looking for.

One of the reasons Fisher I was remanded back to the Fifth Circuit was so that the University could show how the admissions program was narrowly tailored to achieve its asserted interest; in other words, the University failed to carry that burden the first time. As the Court (by a majority of 7 to 1) stated in its opinion remanding the case, narrow tailoring requires “a careful judicial inquiry into whether a university could achieve sufficient diversity without using racial classifications.”

Comparing the Fisher II opinion to the arguments asserted in the briefs, it’s clear that Justice Kennedy failed to make such a “careful” inquiry and instead tried to make arguments for the University that the University itself could not make with sufficient clarity to carry its burden the second go-around. He assessed the efficacy of the program by citing strange statistics such as the percentage of classes with at least five students that have at least one African American enrolled in the class. He then compared those numbers to somewhat-tangential demographics such as the total number of African Americans enrolled in the student body. These are statistical apples and oranges. While he later made an apt comparison of minority students admitted under the “holistic” review in 2003 and in 2007, the fact that the University has achieved some gains in diversity says nothing about whether the program is narrowly tailored. Moreover, as Justice Alito points out in footnote 14, the marginal effect of those gains is miniscule. And as both the University and Justice Kennedy acknowledge, there may be other reasons for those gains: the University has greatly expanded its outreach to minorities and has added numerous scholarship opportunities directed at minorities.

Important in all of this is to remember that the burden is on the University to prove that the program is narrowly tailored—not on the Petitioner to prove that it is not narrowly tailored. Justice Kennedy flipped the burden on its head (as is especially clear on pages 11–19 of his opinion). Even so, he also dismissed the fact that the Petitioner did offer a less-restrictive alternative: race-blind holistic review. While stating that the University had tried that method and had failed, neither he nor the University offered any support for that claim. I will say it one last time: the burden is on the University, and the University failed to carry its burden.

All of this is not to say that affirmative action is always unconstitutional. I believe there are compelling benefits to having a diverse student body. And perhaps there are other, more compelling interests that the University could have asserted. (Keep in mind, though, that the Court has held multiple times that affirmative action is not justified based on remedying past racial injustices.) But the law is not about what “could have” been; it is about what is. And in this case, the fact is that the majority opinion failed to properly apply strict scrutiny.

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Jacob: As preface, I want to clarify that what follows is not an argument over merits of affirmative action as a policy; it is a legal analysis of this particular case. Good ideas do not necessarily translate into constitutionally justifiable policy. And in this instance, the policy at issue was not constitutionally justifiable. I agree with David that the majority misapplied the narrowly tailored requirement of strict scrutiny; better stated, the University did not carry its burden to prove that its admissions policy was narrowly tailored. But I believe the University did not even satisfy the first step in strict-scrutiny analysis—asserting a compelling interest—which means there is no need to each reach a narrow-tailoring analysis.

In the Equal Protection context, any law that utilizes race-based classifications receives strict-scrutiny review from courts. As David mentioned, this means that the burden is on the state actor to prove that (1) a compelling interest exists to justify the race-based policy, and that (2) the law is narrowly tailored to effectuate that interest. In this case, the University argued several interests, with the main one being the “educational benefits of diversity.” Setting aside for a moment the question of whether that interest is compelling, the University never gave concrete reasons to clarify that interest with enough specificity to move on to narrow tailoring. Furthermore, to judge whether this interest is being achieved, the University said that it would know the policy is working “when it ‘see[s] the educational benefits happening.’” Such a vague definition of the ends renders any court incapable of determining whether the narrow tailoring factor is met. This essentially hands all the power to university administrators: if the interest and goals of the policy are subject to change or are difficult to ascertain, it is nearly impossible for a court to identify when they have been met and whether the program passes constitutional muster. Critically, if the interest is broad and amorphous, it is impossible for the policy to be narrowly tailored as required by strict scrutiny; there is no limiting principle. What the University’s argument boils down to is saying “trust us, we know what we’re doing.” That has never been sufficient to survive strict scrutiny.

If this were any other, non-race-based policy, the interest asserted might be acceptable. But this not another policy; this is a race-based classification. As Justice Alito mentioned in his dissent, “[R]acial classifications are permitted only as a ‘last resort’ when all else has failed.” In a prior case, Justice Kennedy wrote that “racial and ethnic distinctions of any sort are inherently suspect and thus call for the most exacting judicial examination.” The University in this case is trying to justify discrimination on the basis of race with ambiguous notions of racial diversity. But even if it could have proved a concrete goal behind the diversity interest, it would not be sufficient to pass strict scrutiny. As noted above, there are three tiers of review in Equal Protection analysis: rational basis, intermediate scrutiny, and strict scrutiny. The details of the tests are not important, but which test applies in any given situation often determines the outcome of the case. For instance, if the Court applies rational basis, the government wins 99% of the time. If intermediate scrutiny applies, the government often loses. And if strict scrutiny applies, the government loses 99% of the time. This should give you some indication of how difficult it is for a state action to survive strict scrutiny.

So is racial diversity in education is a compelling interest? I am not saying it is not important as a social goal, nor commenting on the merits of reverse discrimination as a social construct. I am talking about “compelling” within the framework of the most demanding constitutional review that exists. I believe that there has not yet been an interest presented to the Court that is compelling enough to justify a race-based law, allowing the government to treat citizens differently under the law based on race. I agree with Justice Thomas (yes, you heard me: I agree with Justice Thomas) when he wrote, “The Constitution abhors classifications based on race because every time the government places citizens on racial registers and makes race relevant to the provision of burdens and benefits, it demeans us all.” Justice Kennedy has even gone so far as to state that “judicial review must begin from the position that ‘any official action that treats a person differently on account of his race or ethnic origin is inherently suspect.’”

As a final note, compare racial diversity in education to some compelling interests that have been accepted by the Court: national security, public health, public safety and security, etc. Still convinced that diversity in education is an interest compelling enough to overcome a history of striking down racially based laws? I’m not convinced. The University’s policy confers benefits and burdens disproportionally based on a person’s race, even if it does so to promote diversity in education. That interest not compelling enough to justify intentional racial discrimination by the government and conflicts with the Court’s history of rendering race-based laws unconstitutional. For that reason alone, the majority reached the wrong conclusion.

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Click here for Part Two of our series covering Fisher v. University of Texas.

Dear Oklahomans Who Want to Leave…

By David Postic

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I love Oklahoma.

There is something about this state that holds a special place in my heart, aside from it being my home. Anyone who has looked out across the endless plains knows what I mean. The flatness of it all is intoxicating. But even more than the geography, it is the people that makes this place special. Oklahomans themselves are incredibly caring individuals, true salt-of-the-earth, born and bred on an ethic of hard work and on a faith so pervasive that it guides every part of their lives. Ours is a state with an enormous potential for diversity, prosperity, and opportunity.

But we have not lived up to that potential.

The actions of some of our governmental officers and representatives have shown that we, as a state, have either misplaced or misprioritized our values. And it’s something we need to fix. Rather than open our arms to diversity and tolerance, we have passed laws to discourage it. Rather than create opportunity, we have stolen it away from the most vulnerable in our society. Rather than look to the future — both in terms of our budget and our children — we have chosen instead to repeat the mistakes of the past. Whatever a properly functioning government looks like, this isn’t it.

This goes beyond the (embarrassing, in my opinion) events of the past few days (e.g., the continued assault on transgender rights, the admittedly unconstitutional abortion bill, the dishonest and inhumane decisions of the governor’s office vis-à-vis execution drugs). It goes to the heart of who we are as a people. Because although it is our elected officials who have caused these events to pass, it is we who elected them and continue to re-elect them. (I note here that there are more than a few courageous officials who have taken a stand against the rising tide of hatred and irresponsible government, and as a result they are not the subject of this complaint.) That’s on us. Authority without accountability breeds tyranny, and that is precisely what we are beginning to see.

But it is not only the particular representatives of our government that we need to hold accountable; we must hold accountable our system of government itself. Our system is based on politics and politicking, and as entertaining as it is to watch (and as necessary as it may be to some extent), it has become destructive. Politics — in my ideal vision of the concept — is simply a dream of (and a means to) establishing good government. At its heart, and what it most seeks to promote, is the body politic: the people. That is the basis of our democratic republic.

Today, however, politics has become divorced from the good of the people. Politics is no longer concerned with the body politic; it no longer cares. Not about you, not about me. It no longer cares about anything except winning and legacy and airtime and money. I am even convinced that politics writ large does not actually care about making the world a better place. Politics is no longer a solution; it is not a cure. It is a virus that spreads and infects everything and everyone it comes into contact with. Politics is no longer synonymous with statecraft or diplomacy or improvement. It is about maneuvering and brinkmanship and ultimatums. Politics today is more about grandstanding and fearmongering and fundraising and celebritizing than fixing and building and moving forward and helping people.

Why has this “new politics” become the mainstay? How did we get here? More than a little of the blame falls on us, the people. By and large, we do not want politicians to compromise — not on gun control, abortion, immigration, climate change, the budget, or anything else. All we want is for our guy to win, our side to win. Because for some reason, we have created a binary world where there is only right and wrong, winning and losing. There is no room for shades of gray, no room for discussion. And so it is that we as a society have come to view compromise as the antithesis of winning, something we wish to avoid at all costs. The media (and we, the consumers of media) have perpetuated this culture by buying into the hateful rhetoric and by accepting at face value the “facts” we are given. We do not verify, we do not seek the truth. We do not listen to people anymore. We hear them, and we speak to them, but we do not listen to them. There is no dialogue, and consequently there is no understanding. And that is a serious problem. Because if we ever want to work out our differences, we need to listen to each other. We need to understand. We need to care.

I am of the perhaps hopelessly optimistic opinion that our differences are not so great, political or otherwise, that we cannot overcome them. I do not believe that we are forever condemned to this destructive breed of “new politics.” I believe that Oklahoma — and the nation — can do better, and it starts with us. It starts with informed, passionate, caring people taking notice of the injustices and prejudices and wrongs that exist in our society and committing themselves to doing better, and electing representatives that are committed to doing better. We cannot fall victim to apathy, that old friend of oppression. We must do something.

It is no secret that making a better future will not be easy, and I am not going to try to make it seem easier than it is. Balancing budgets and funding schools and fixing bridges and providing health care and helping the poor and reducing violence will not be easy. It will be hard. It will be very, very, very, frustratingly, miserably hard. It will require sacrifice. It will demand our money, our comfort, our passions, our pride, our attention, our differences, and our egos. It will take everything we have.

Facing these large problems, and seeing discrimination and injustice perpetrated by the very government sworn to protect the liberties of its citizens, many young Oklahomans have given up. Oklahoma is beyond repair, they say. It’s a backwards state. They are embarrassed to be from here. They no longer see a future for this state and decide instead to leave it. The politics and politicians of Oklahoma are inspiring a mass exodus of young, talented individuals. This is more than just brain drain. It is passion drainand potential drain. And it is entirely unnecessary. This state has lost many of my friends, exasperated at the seemingly fixed order of things and the insurmountable obstacles ingrained into the very fabric of our government. I try to convince them to stay, to help fix things, but the politics and prejudices of Oklahoma are making my argument increasingly difficult.

But still, I must make it. Because the only hope for a brighter future in this state is a new generation of Oklahomans standing up for what is right and responsible when it comes to government. So to all young Oklahomans considering leaving this state: stay. The problems are big, but so are the possibilities. The path is not easy, but the reward will be worthwhile. Stay, and we can fight to bring this state back from the brink of self-destruction. Stay, and we can find solutions, make progress, and create a better Oklahoma, a better home for us all. We cannot do it without you. The people of this state deserve better. They don’t deserve irresponsible government and bigotry and the kind of politics that doesn’t care about them. Stay, and help give the people of this state the government they deserve. Isn’t that worth something?

Oklahoma is a special place, but it is in dire need of help. Its people are in dire need of help. So what can you do? You can stay. You can care about Oklahomans and about what happens to them. It will take time and patience — ungodly amounts of patience — but a better future is possible. We can make it happen if we work together.

Oklahoma is my home, and I plan to stay here and make it better. I hope you do too.

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See this original post on Medium.

How You Should Remember Antonin Scalia

By David Postic, Jacob Daniel, and Lester Asamoah

 

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The Supreme Court holds an interesting place in American pop culture: At once, it is one of the most highly visible and highly misunderstood parts of our government. And it is not only the Court that is misunderstood, but its members as well. By now, the entire world likely knows of the passing of Justice Antonin Scalia—the longest-serving member of the current Supreme Court and, perhaps, its most controversial member. In his thirty years on the bench, Justice Scalia emerged as the intellectual power behind conservative jurisprudence and became (in)famous for the stinging and colorful language of his opinions, particularly his dissents. His death has an immediate impact on the Court. For instance, any cases currently before the Court with votes that have not yet been made public are now void, and the justices must re-vote. And with only eight justices on the Court—four conservative and four liberal—ties are now a strong possibility, meaning that some of the more politically charged cases—including affirmative action, the President’s executive action on immigration, and voting rights—may not be completely resolved by the Court, for any tied opinion is not binding Supreme Court precedent, and the Circuit Court opinion stands as precedent for that Circuit.

As such a controversial (and political) figure, the news surrounding Justice Scalia’s death has focused almost exclusively on these quasi-political issues, as well as who will take his place on the Court. So that you will be an informed citizen in the following (what will surely be politically crazy) months, here is how the nomination process works:

1. The United States Senate is charged with confirming the President’s nomination for filling Scalia’s seat, but the Senate conducts that process in several steps. First, the Senate Judiciary committee holds a hearing for the nominee.
2. After the hearing, the committee votes to give a positive/negative recommendation or no recommendation for the nominee.
3. After the Judiciary committee votes, the full Senate then conducts a hearing chaired again by the Senate Judiciary chairman.
4. Once debate ends, the full Senate conducts a vote. If the nominee commands a simple majority, he/she is confirmed.

There are, however, ways that the Senate can hold up these proceedings before the final vote. Individual senators (or a group of senators) can filibuster endlessly the cloture rule, which requires 60 Senators to invoke, limits the debate to 30 hours. Typically the opposing party is reluctant to confirm a lifetime appointment during the last year of a lame-duck presidency. In fact, there is a name for this type of stonewalling: the Thurmond Rule, named for the late Senator Strom Thurmond (R-S.C.), who decreed that no judicial appointments would move in the last six months of a lame-duck presidency. While Majority Leader Mitch McConnell (R-K.Y.) has made headlines for saying he will not allow a confirmation for Scalia’s replacement, Senator Harry Reid (D-N.V.) made similar statements in 2008. So despite Republican senators making headlines for their “no confirmation” decrees, holding up a judicial nominee in this situation is not solely a Republican tactic.

Nevertheless, these issues will be covered heavily in the coming months (it could even stretch into next year), and hopefully you take time to understand all the political issues at play. It really is fascinating. But while these issues are interesting and, indeed, of great importance to our country, it seems that there has been far too little focus on the man that provoked these issues—Justice Scalia himself. As a result, and in honor of one of the most powerful men in the country, we would like to take a step back and examine the legacy that Scalia left behind.

Justice Scalia was appointed to the Supreme Court by Ronald Reagan in 1986 after spending most of his legal career working in the public sector. Amazingly, Scalia was confirmed by the Senate by a vote of 98-0—a result perhaps unthinkable in the current political climate. But such was the charm and intellectual prowess of Antonin Scalia.

Almost immediately he established himself as a unique voice on the Court, not afraid to go against the rest of the justices on any opinion that provoked his ire. In 1988, for example, he drafted a thirty-page dissent in Morrison v. Olson, writing so emotionally that Justice Harry Blackmun felt obliged to note, “[I]t could be cut down to ten pages if Scalia omitted the screaming.” But that passion was Scalia’s calling card, and his reputation for emotional dissents calls to mind the similarly stubborn Oliver Wendell Holmes: a man held by many to be one of the greatest justices to ever sit on the Court. And for all of their legal and philosophical differences, Oliver Wendell Holmes serves as perhaps the best modern comparison for what Justice Scalia meant to the Supreme Court.

Scalia was never afraid to make his opinions known—both in and out of the courtroom. He famously concurred in Bush v. Gore, the case that essentially decided the 2000 presidential election between George W. Bush and Al Gore. Years later, when Scalia was asked about the effect of that case on the American democracy, his reply was brief: “Get over it.” As Conor Clarke of Slate commented, “His writing style is best described as equal parts anger, confidence, and pageantry. Scalia has a taste for garish analogies and offbeat allusions—often very funny ones—and he speaks in no uncertain terms. He is highly accessible and tries not to get bogged down in abstruse legal jargon. But most of all, Scalia’s opinions read like they’re about to catch fire for pure outrage. He does not, in short, write like a happy man.”

But by all accounts, Justice Scalia was a happy man. His close friend (and near-ideological opposite) on the bench, Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, once said that Scalia was “an absolutely charming man, and he can make even the most sober judge laugh.” Indeed, a 2005 study showed that he brought the Court to laughter more than any of his colleagues. He brought a witty dynamism to the Court’s oral arguments, which he often used to spice up otherwise bland legal issues in his written opinions. For all you might disagree with how he voted on cases, I dare you to read one of Justice Scalia’s arguments and not feel a tug of doubt on your own convictions. That is the keen legal mind that was Antonin Scalia.

Justice Scalia was an originalist, a judicial philosophy that believes the Constitution should be interpreted accordingly to what the text meant at the time the document was ratified over two centuries ago. This view runs counter to the popular legal view of the Constitution as a “living document” that evolves as society evolves. But in Scalia’s originalism, the Constitution was not supposed to facilitate change: it was designed to prevent changes in the fundamental rights that the Founders fought so hard to secure. Scalia hated so-called “judicial activism” and believed that the legislature—as the representatives of the People—should be the true engine of legal change. It was these views that often prompted critics to accuse Scalia of letting his conservative political leanings compromise his legal judgment. But Justice Scalia was far from a rigid conservative, at least politically: He voted to uphold free speech in the Texas flag-burning case, and also struck down a prohibition on hate speech—liberal legal decisions by any measure. Disagree with him all you want, Scalia was his own man to the very end.

He was, as most great and controversial figures are, an extremely dynamic and likable individual. This is the Scalia that people should remember. Sure, remember his controversial philosophies, remember all his opinions that you disagreed with, remember his passion and his emotion and his anger. But also remember Justice Scalia for what he was: an intellectual powerhouse, a deeply thoughtful and philosophical legal mind, a man who adhered to his values and principles, and a legal titan of the twenty-first century.

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David Postic is a law student at the University of Oklahoma.

Jacob Daniel is a law student at the University of Oklahoma.

Lester Asamoah is a graduate student at American University.

Why Love Won

Not every day do the worlds of law and pop culture collide so tremendously as they did today. Then again, not every day do you have Supreme Court decisions like Obergefell v. Hodges. Undoubtedly you have read close to 525,600 Facebook statuses, tweets, and news clippings about this landmark victory for gay rights. You may be rejoicing. You may be livid. Let’s put those emotions aside for a moment to assess the Obergefell opinion and figure out why love won.

First, a brief history…

Obergefell is certainly a revolutionary decision. But for those following the Court (and political trends) over the past fifteen years, it is hardly a surprise. Prior to the 2000s, a number of states had passed laws criminalizing certain homosexual acts. In Lawrence v. Texas (2003), Justice Anthony Kennedy, writing for the Court, held that such laws discriminated on the basis of sexual orientation and thus violated the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution.

This was a huge step forward for gay rights, but there still remained the matter of gay marriage. In 1996, Congress had passed the Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA), which defined marriage for all federal law purposes as “only a legal union between one man and one woman as husband and wife.” However, in the ten years after Lawrence v. Texas, several states granted marriage rights to same-sex couples, either through judicial or legislative processes. Still, DOMA remained alive-and-well.

Then, in 2013, the Court held in United States v. Windsor (2013) that DOMA was invalid to the extent that it barred the federal government from treating same-sex marriages as valid even when they were lawful in the state where they were licensed. Again, a massive victory for gay rights. (And again, Justice Kennedy authored the opinion.) But what did this mean? It meant that, for example (and as was the case in Windsor), the surviving spouse of a same-sex couple could claim a spousal deduction from the federal estate tax. While this was another huge leap forward, it still did not legalize gay marriage. But by overturning DOMA, it did clear the way for other courts to do so.

Now to today’s opinion…

In the two years since Windsor, many same-sex marriage cases have reached federal courts of appeals, and gay marriage has been legalized in many jurisdictions. But there was still a major problem: A same-sex couple married in one state (where gay marriage was legal) could travel to another state (where gay marriage was not legal) and be denied the benefits of marriage. This meant gay couples could not take advantage of certain spousal tax benefits; evidentiary privileges; adoption rights; medical decision making authority; and so on.

Finally, however, some of these cases reached the Supreme Court in the form of Obergefell v. Hodges (2015), which is actually a combination of several similarly situated cases. In this case, the Court was confronted with the question of whether or not gay marriage is a constitutionally protected right. The issue could be avoided no longer.

As you now know, the Court’s opinion (once again authored by, you guessed it: Justice Kennedy) held that a “fundamental right to marry” can no longer be denied because the partners are of the same sex. Gay marriage–nationwide–is now not only legal, but constitutionally protected. The Court interpreted the two central provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment (the Due Process Clause and the Equal Protection Clause) to mean that same-sex and opposite-sex marriages are equal under the law.

The opinion itself is beautiful in its simplicity. Much of it is devoted to the judicial history summarized above (although to get a full view of that history, you should definitely read the opinion) as well as cultural and political developments spanning the entirety of human civilization. But the meat of the opinion, the real holding (a legal term meaning the binding law of the case), was this: The right to marriage is a right enjoyed equally by all people, gay or straight. This, the Court explained, is firmly rooted in our nation’s history: From past Supreme Court decisions affirming the equality of interracial marriage, to decisions affirming the autonomy of individuals to make of their lives what they will. The issue is not, as some people have framed it, whether there is a constitutional right to gay marriage, but instead whether there is a constitutional right to marriage period. The Highest Court of the Land has now firmly stated that there is such a right.

The majority encountered staunch opposition from the other justices. In fact, each of the justices in the minority (Chief Justice John Roberts, Justice Antonin Scalia, Justice Clarence Thomas, and Justice Samuel Alito) wrote a separate dissenting opinion. These dissents are of varying degrees of ire and outrage. Yet the one argument that you will most likely hear disparaging Obergefell is that the Court today engaged in “judicial activism.” Chief Justice Roberts encapsulated this argument when he criticized the majority, reciting the ages-old aphorism that, under the Constitution, judges have power to say what the law is–not what it should be.

As with all age-old sayings, I encourage you to take this one with a grain of salt. (But certainly I am not saying you are wrong if you agree with Chief Justice Roberts). Because the line between what the law is and what it should be is a very thin one and is entirely a matter of perspective. The Court’s opinion today affirms a strong heritage of individual autonomy when it comes to the most private and intimate decisions in life. In a separate string of cases (see Loving v. Virginia and Turner v. Safley), the Supreme Court has consistently held that the right to marriage is a right enjoyed by all. The Court’s decision today simply affirmed that sentiment, regardless of sexual orientation. That is what the majority believed the law is. This is what they believed Court precedent compelled them to do. You may agree or disagree (you would be in good company with 4 of the 9 justices on the Supreme Court), but the law is what it is.

So what does this mean for me?

You now have permission to unpack those emotions we put aside at the beginning of this article. This is an opinion that invites a lot of passion from both sides, and rightly so. Even the Supreme Court itself was sharply divided in this close 5-4 decision. You will hear people rejoicing in the spirit of equality. You will hear people decrying the opinion as an affront to Christianity or other religious and moral beliefs. The vehemence of these opinions will not fade quickly. But I am sure that, eventually, it will fade.

From a legal perspective, I loved the decision of Obergefell v. Hodges. In my opinion it got the law exactly right. People may disagree because gay marriage does not fit into their religion; yet the First Amendment prohibits the government from establishing or favoring a religion, so it cannot prohibit gay marriage on those grounds. People may say that gay marriage is not supported by the history and tradition of our country (echoing, in some ways, that same religious argument); yet there is a dearth of case law proving otherwise; and moreover, just because we have always done something does not mean we should continue to do it (e.g., slavery, subjugation of women). People may say that they hate this opinion because, honestly, they just hate gay people. I wish those people did not exist in our society, but they do. And unfortunately, there is no logical or constitutional argument that can persuade people out of their hatred.

Apart from the legality of it all, though, I think it is quite definitely the most beautifully written opinion I have ever read (and as a law student I have, regrettably, read thousands of opinions). It is simple, artful, and bold in ways that causes one to pause and realize that you are indeed witnessing history unfolding before you. There are not many 28-page opinions I enjoy reading, but Justice Kennedy wrote so wonderfully that it sang. It was in many ways a masterpiece. You should really take time to read it (and form your own opinions).

Personally, I am so incredibly happy today for all my gay friends, that you have had your love recognized as a constitutional right that is now the law of the land. Today must feel like a dream come true, and I am truly, truly glad for you. And to all those who are disappointed with today’s ruling, I want to remind you of this: You can disapprove of the Court’s decision but still be happy for the millions of people who are today reveling in love. You can oppose the law without opposing the people affected by the law. You can fight for change without fighting one another. That is the difference between opposition and prejudice. And that is how we can make sure that love really does win.

*****

An Assortment of Favorite Passages From the Opinion

The nature of injustice is that we may not always see it in our own times. The generations that wrote and ratified the Bill of Rights and the Fourteenth Amendment did not presume to know the extent of freedom in all of its dimensions, and so they entrusted to future generations a character protecting the right of all persons to enjoy liberty as we learn its meaning.

*****

The dynamic of our constitutional system is that individuals need not await legislative action before asserting a fundamental right. The Nation’s courts are open to injured individuals who come to them to vindicate their own direct, personal stake in our basic charter. An individual can invoke a right to constitutional protection when he or she is harmed, even if the broader public disagrees and even if the legislature refuses to act. The idea of the Constitution was to withdraw certain subjects from the vicissitudes of political controversy, to place them beyond the reach of majorities and officials and to establish them as legal principles to be applied by the courts.

*****

The nature of marriage is that, through its enduring bond, two persons together can find other freedoms, such as expression, intimacy, and spirituality. This is true for all persons, whatever their sexual orientation.

*****

From their beginning to their most recent page, the annals of human history reveal the transcendent importance of marriage. The lifelong union of a man and a woman always has promised nobility and dignity to all persons, without regard to their station in life. Marriage is sacred to those who live by their religions and offers unique fulfillment to those who find meaning in the secular realm. Its dynamic allows two people to find a life that could not be found alone, for a marriage becomes greater than just the two persons. Rising from the most basic human needs, marriage is essential to our most profound hopes and aspirations.

*****

No union is more profound than marriage, for it embodies the highest ideals of love, fidelity, devotion, sacrifice, and family. In forming a marital union, two people become something greater than once they were. As some of the petitioners in these cases demonstrate, marriage embodies a love that may endure even past death. It would misunderstand these men and women to say they disrespect the idea of marriage. Their plea is that they do respect it, respect it so deeply that they seek to find its fulfillment for themselves. Their hope is not to be condemned to live in loneliness, excluded from one of civilization’s oldest institutions. They ask for equal dignity in the eyes of the law. The Constitution grants them that right.

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David Postic is a third-year law student at the University of Oklahoma.

Education Links We Love (July 25th, 2014)

Each Friday, we here at Thirty-Eight Minutes post our five favorite education-themed articles from around the web this week. But due to our absence last week, we are going DOUBLE with TEN links this week (queue applause). Alas, we are but five guys with limited time to surf the furthest reaches of the Internet. So, as always, we would love any additional articles worth reading. If you find any, please post them below and share your discoveries with us.

Four Technology Trends Changing Higher Education (Edudemic)

Five U.S. Innovations That American Reformers Ignore (Washington Post)

Meet the 22-Year-Old Who is Closing the Summer Achievement Gap (Atlantic)

Moving Toward a New Model for Education (Edutopia)

Janet Barresi Loses Her Cool* (NewsOK)

University of Oklahoma Offers Debt Forgiveness (Tulsa World)

Classroom Leaves the Syllabus to the Students (NY Times)

5 ‘Dirty Words’ Admissions Offices Should Embrace (Chronicle)

Why is it So Hard to Change How We Teach Math? (Mind Shift)

STEM vs. STEAM: A Look At Half-Brain Teaching (Edudemic)

*Always fun to watch

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David Postic is a second-year law student at the University of Oklahoma.

29 Things I Learned From The World Cup

By David Postic

 

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As we draw near to the end of the year’s greatest sporting event, I would like to get a few things off my chest. First of all: I know next to nothing about soccer (or fútbol, for those of you who actually know things about soccer). I played it for years growing up, but there were way fewer rules and the game mostly consisted of us kids running around in a pack, waiting until halftime so we could have Capri Sun and Fruit Gushers. This is not the soccer I’ve seen in the World Cup. So on behalf of all the non-soccer fans out there, here are my observations:

1. There isn’t as much head butting as I was led to believe.

2. However, there is more biting than I was led to believe.

3. It is apparently mandatory for most soccer players to have the Macklemore haircut.

4. The amount of gel in your hair is directly proportional to how good you are.

5. Bonus points for having a shape and/or words shaved into your hair.

6. Penalty kicks are the worst thing in the history of the world.

7. Soccer announcers are glorious human beings.

8. The most random countries are really good at soccer.

9. For example: Bosnia-Herzegovina? Chile? Croatia? Gondor? Narnia?

10. America is not really good at soccer.

11. American fans are pretty good at being soccer fans, though.

12. Soccer fans are generally insane.

13. Teddy Roosevelt is a soccer fan.

14. Ergo, Teddy Roosevelt is insane (also dead).

15. Stoppage time is dumb. We have technology. Just stop the clock.

16. I have seen way fewer bicycle kicks (0) than I expected (every single kick).

17. Brazil seems super upset right now.

18. Germany scored 7 goals in 90 minutes.

19. That’s a rate of 1 goal every 13 minutes.

20. Argentina and Belgium combined for 0 goals in 120 minutes.

21. That’s a rate of 0 goals every infinity minutes.

22. I can score 0 goals every infinity minutes.

23. Watching someone score a goal is one of the most exciting parts of my life.

24. Soccer players are really nice to each other.

25. Except when they’re biting each other.

26. Not having commercials is by far the biggest draw of watching soccer matches.

27. I still don’t get what constitutes offsides.

28. I also don’t get why Pitbull was chosen to sing the official 2014 World Cup theme song.

29. I miss the 2010 World Cup theme song.

And those are my thoughts on soccer.

After watching literally days of World Cup soccer, I can honestly say that I still barely have any idea what’s going on. But I am learning. More importantly, the game is really growing on me. The world’s most popular sport has this inexplicable charm to it that makes it a joy to watch. And on those rare occasions (other than the Germany-Brazil match) where someone actually scores a goal, I find myself yelping with joy. It is a wonderful, wonderful game. And I will thoroughly miss it for the next four years until America cares about it again.

See this post on BuzzFeed.

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David Postic is a second-year law student at the University of Oklahoma.

Education Links We Love (July 11th, 2014)

Each Friday, we here at Thirty-Eight Minutes post our five favorite education-themed articles from around the web this week. Alas, we are but five guys with limited time to surf the furthest reaches of the Internet. So, as always, we would love any additional articles worth reading. If you find any, please post them below and share your discoveries with us.

The Hard Part (Huffington Post)

How to Read Education Data Without Jumping to Conclusions (The Atlantic)

Tennessee Moves Away from Test Scores on Teacher Evaluations (Education News)

How a Text Message Could Revolutionize Student Aid (NPR)

Jobs After College: It’s What You Know, Not Where You Go (Education Views)

10 Most Important SCOTUS Decisions of 2014

By Lester Asamoah and David Postic

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Last week’s Supreme Court ruling in Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores set the social media world (and the regular world, for that matter) on fire. Suddenly, people who usually couldn’t care less what those nine crazy old people say got all excited and started tweeting about it. In other words, Hobby Lobby was essentially the World Cup of Supreme Court rulings.

However, Hobby Lobby was not the only case the Supreme Court (or SCOTUS, for those who like acronyms) covered this term. In our opinion it wasn’t even the most important. Considering that the Court hears between 80 and 90 cases each year–on a wide range of issues–it is important to know what they decide outside of this one little case. Below we have ranked and summarized the ten most important cases from this term.

1. McCutcheon v. Federal Election Commission

Background: If you don’t know anything about the Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission decision from 2010, stop now and go learn about it. Essentially, this case (like Citizens United) is about how much an individual can contribute to a political candidate, political party, or political action committee (PAC). McCutcheon was not arguing for the right to donate more money to a single candidate; rather, he wanted to be able to donate money to more candidates/parties/PACs. However, limitations on aggregate contributions constrained his giving, supposedly violating his First Amendment right to free speech.

Holding: The Court ruled in favor of McCutcheon 5-4. The practical effect of McCutcheon is that individuals will still be subject to a limit (currently $2600) on contributions to any one candidate and higher limits on contributions to any PAC or party committee.  Now, however, donors will no longer be limited in the number of candidates or committees they may support in any given election cycle. Viewed together, Citizens United and McCutcheon strike a major blow to proponents of campaign finance reform.

2. Burwell v. Hobby Lobby

Background: The Affordable Care Act (Obamacare) requires employers to provide their female employees with health insurance that includes no-cost access to twenty different kinds of contraceptives. Hobby Lobby, a craft store owned by a Christian family, objected to the requirement, specifically claiming that four types of contraceptives (two kinds of “morning after” pills and two kinds of IUDs–interuterine devices) are abortifacients and therefore burdensome to the free practice of their Christian religion.

Holding: The Court ruled 5-4 in favor of Hobby Lobby. The first important thing to note here is that this ruling was not one centered strictly on the Constitution. Rather it was mainly a statutory issue concerning the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993. The decision here did not destroy Obamacare’s individual mandate; it also did not grant all businesses religious exceptions to Obamacare. The majority claims that this ruling is a narrow one that applies only to closely-held corporations and only on an issue such as contraceptives and only when it places a significant burden on religious freedom. Nevertheless, the dissenters (led by Justice Ginsburgh in what may be one of her most fiery dissents in recent years) claimed the majority established dangerous precedent that could have ramifications in racial discrimination, same-sex discrimination, and other issues.

3. Schuette v. Coalition to Defend Affirmative Action

Background: If you are unfamiliar with affirmative action, take 5 minutes to orient yourself. In 2006, Michigan voters approved Proposal 2, which prevented the state’s public colleges and universities from granting preferential treatment in the admissions process on the basis of race.

Holding: In a 6-2 decision (Justice Kagan recused herself), the Court ruled that voters can end state affirmative action programs. The opinion will not prevent universities from using race as a plus-factor in admissions processes; it merely stated that voters have the power to ban the use of racial preferences. Nevertheless, the dissent and proponents of affirmative action believe that this is a major setback for racial equality. While the decision focused on race-based admissions factors in universities, it would presumably also permit voters to end race-based policies in the hiring of state and local employees and in awarding public contracts.

4. American Broadcasting Companies v. Aereo

Background: Aereo invented a technology that allows subscribers to view and record television broadcasts over the Internet by swiping the broadcasts from the airwaves with thousands of tiny antennas. Because the startup did not receive permission to stream these broadcasts, broadcasting companies sued Aereo, claiming copyright infringement. However, Aereo claimed that they were not infringing on any copyrights–they were simply renting antennas to consumers and they were doing the rest.

Opposing Aereo were the broadcasting companies, as well as corporations such as the National Football League and Major League Baseball, which earn hundreds of millions of dollars selling their broadcasting rights. On Aereo’s side was the cable industry. If Aereo won, cable companies would be able to sell their own Aereo-esque technology and provide broadcast content without paying broadcasters a penny. Interesting to note here: When Aereo won its case on the 2nd Circuit Court of Appeals last year, CBS and Fox threatened to go off the air.

Holding: The Supreme Court ruled against Aereo in a 6-3 decision. The justices seemed anxious to avoid a ruling that would imperil the legal foundation of cloud computing services such as Dropbox and Amazon Cloud Music. Instead, the majority said the decision pertained only to Aereo’s system so far as it enabled its viewers to view copyrighted TV programs “live,” or after only a brief delay. In the increasingly dramatic fight between cable companies and broadcasters, Aereo affirmed in part the power of the broadcasting industry.

5. Riley v. California

Background: A California police officer stopped the petitioner, Riley, for a traffic violation that eventually led to his arrest on weapons charges. When Riley was arrested, his cellphone was taken and searched. The police officer found photo and video content suggesting that he was involved a particular gang shooting. Riley moved to suppress the evidence from his phone connecting him to the gang, but the trial court denied the motion and he was convicted.

Holding: In a 9-0 decision, the Court held that the police may not search the cellphone of an individual who is arrested. All nine justices maintained that such digital content may only be searched with a warrant. Riley does not have a direct impact on allegations of government monitoring personal information, but it is a big win for personal privacy and the Fourth Amendment by reaffirming constitutional protections in an increasingly digital world.

6. Town of Greece v. Galloway

Background: Town board meetings in Greece, NY open with roll call, recitation of the Pledge of Allegiance, and a prayer and have done so since 1999. The town’s prayer program is open to all creeds, but all of the local congregations are Christian. Thus, nearly all of the prayers are Christian prayers. Respondents Galloway and Stephens argued that the prayers go against their personal religious and philosophical beliefs – they arguethe town should have “inclusive and ecumenical” prayers that would not associate the government with one belief system.

Holding: In a tight 5-4 decision, the Court held that the town of Greece was not violating the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment. The prayers have Christian elements, but they also invoke a sense of spiritual and civil principles. Additionally, the majority believed that reasonable attempts were made to include clergy of different faiths. Regardless, this case is big for religious freedom. The “traditional” protections that Congress and state legislatures have for prayer are now extended to local civil entities. City of Greece 1 – Laicism 0.

7. Hall v. Florida

Background: A man (Hall) kidnapped, beat, raped, and murdered Karol Hurst, a 21 year old newlywed. After killing her, Hall and his accomplice planned to rob a convenience store but were stopped by in the parking lot by a sheriff’s deputy. The two men then killed the deputy. The State of Florida recommended the death penalty for both counts of murder. Hall argued he cannot be executed on account of his intellectual disability. Hall’s IQ score is 71, but Florida laws state that an IQ score of 70 or below is required to present additional evidence of an intellectual disability to vacate the sentence.

(Note: Highly recommend reading the opinion brief, Hall was tortured by his mother and faced other troubling circumstances. The Florida jury and appellate court opinions are also worth the read.)

Holding: The Court ruled 5-4 that the state IQ threshold was unconstitutional because it put intellectually disabled individuals at unreasonable risk for being executed. Prior case law has established that any execution of intellectually disabled individuals clearly violates the Eighth Amendment. Florida’s hard and fast IQ threshold was a problem because the law did not account for standard error.

8. NLRB v. Noel Canning

Background: Several members of the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) were appointed by President Obama via the Recess Appointment Clause, which states that the President has the power to temporarily appoint officers without the consent of the Senate if the Senate is in recess. The NLRB members in question were appointed during a three day recess.

Holding: In a unanimous 9-0 decision, the Court ruled Obama’s appointments invalid. Basically, the Justices felt that a three day recess is far too short to make appointments without Senate approval. There is no concrete definition on what is “too short” of a recess. However, it is generally regarded as a “significant interruption of legislative business” (e.g. Summer Recess). The ruling blocks the president from sneaking appointees past the Senate. Yet in a highly partisan Senate, it also slows down the appointment process of key political officials.

9. EPA v. EME Homer City Generation

Background: The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), through the Clean Air Act, established national ambient air quality standards (NAAQS) for pollutants at levels that will protect public health. Once the EPA determines NAAQS, they determine the “non-attainment areas” where a regulated pollutant exceeds the NAAQS. A state with a non-attainment area must submit a solution to the EPA within three years. If the EPA thinks an the solution is inadequate, the EPA develops a Federal Implementation Plan where the EPA takes control. A solution can be ruled inadequate if it is in violation of the Good Neighbor Provision, meaning that the plan must include provisions to prevent regulated pollutants from one state from adversely affecting another [downwind] state.

In 2005, the EPA Clean Air Interstate Rule (CAIR) sought to regulate nitrogen oxide and sulfur dioxide in 27 upwind states. However, the D.C. Circuit Court found fault with CAIR, so the EPA came up with a complex cost-based formula for determining how states should compensate one another. If this case sounds complicated, that’s because it is.

Holding: In a 6-2 decision, the Court reversed the D.C. Circuit’s decision. The decision is significant because President Obama announced an EPA plan last month to combat climate change. The aforementioned Clean Air Act is the source of the EPA’s authority–instead of creating a new law, the EPA regulations are interpretations of the Clean Air Act. Environmental politics are dicey, but the Court gave the EPA a victory.

10. McCullen v. Coakley

Background: The Massachusetts Reproductive Health Care Facilities Act made it a crime to knowingly stand within 35 feet of a public way or sidewalk of an entrance or driveway to a reproductive health care facility. Petitioner McCullen argued that he and others engaged in “sidewalk counseling” by giving women walking toward abortion clinics information about alternatives to abortion. McCullen claimed that the Reproductive Health Care Facilities Act significantly hampered his efforts of “sidewalk counseling”, and thus was a violation of the First and Fourteenth Amendments.

Holding: In a 9-0 decision, the Court ruled the Act unconstitutional. Quite simply, the Justices believed that the State of Massachusetts did not do enough to address clashes between abortion opponents and advocates before passing the Act. In so deciding, the Court continued a strong trend of protecting free speech, even when it is perceived as hateful.

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Lester Asamoah is an International Security Studies senior at the University of  Oklahoma.

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David Postic is a second-year law student at the University of Oklahoma.

TED Talk Tuesday: Geoffrey Canada

Okay, technically this isn’t TED Talk. But Geoffrey Canada has a TED Talk. That counts, right?

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David Postic is a second-year law student at the University of Oklahoma.